

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

**Myth Busted:
Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community**

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The last wave of the EU enlargement has provoked a heated discussion about where exactly the ultimate borders of the EU should be drawn. In this debate, eurosceptics often argue that certain societies are not “European” enough, that they do not share the same political and social values as the original member states. This presumed difference in values is in turn expected to preclude formation of the sense of community within the union. Using empirical data from the European Values Survey, World Values Survey, and Eurobarometer, my paper analyzes the cross-national variation in the popular support of the officially declared core values of the European institutions. It compares impact of three sets of variables, which may explain individual support of the “European” values: systemic-level geographic factors (such as cultural regions), state-level factors (such as economic development), and individual-level characteristics (such as education). If we consider Europe as an imagined community defined by certain values, its boundaries are rather social than spatial. Despite few substantial differences between Western European, post-Communist, and Muslim countries, no single territorial core of the European community can be distinguished as far as the commonality of values is concerned. Similarly, the real spatial distribution of the common European identity and of the confidence in European institutions contradicts both the assumptions of Eurosceptics and the hopes of Eurooptimists. From the sociological point of view, the European community appears rather as a network of the European countries with the exceptionally trustful relations between each other, though trust in reality extends to developed countries in general.

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Introduction

A series of debacles (such as the French referendum about the EU constitution), made clear that the political dimension of integration is not independent from citizens' values, identities, and attitudes. Indeed, various EU officials (including former EU Commission President R. Prodi) and European nation-state politicians (for example Romania's President T. Basescu) have recently referred to the European Union as a "community of values". At the same time, the EU enlargement has provoked a heated discussion about where to draw European borders. Is Turkey still a European country? Should be Morocco integrated into the EU as proposed by Belgium? Where should Europe end in the east? In the Carpathian Mountains? In the Ural? On the Pacific coast of Russia? Obviously, all these questions have serious political implications. But a clearly defined territory of Europe is also claimed to be an important precondition for the constitution of a European collective identity, which is in turn required for further political integration.

My paper analyzes cross-national variations in the popular support of the key European values in order to identify spatial borders of the presumed community of common values. The impact of cultural regions is in turn compared with country-specific factors (such as economic development) and individual characteristics (such as education). This two-level approach should assess better the real significance of cross-national differences, which is usually simply assumed in the ongoing discussion about the European community of values and its borders. Another goal of the paper is to identify the territorial extent of such a community if it does exist.

In addition to values, I also study the spatial distribution of the common European identity and citizens' confidence in supranational institutions. Can be the imagined community of Europe identified in the

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same way as the imagined communities of the nation states are, that is by a collective identity and loyalty to common institutions?

Finally, I approach the European community from a different perspective (yet still heavily borrowing from political sociology): I study the mutual trust between European (and non-European) countries in order to identify the European community as a bounded network of trustful relations.

Theoretical Framework

Much of the debate about the future of the EU, including a wide range of topics from the desirability of future enlargement to the democratic deficit of the union's chief institutions, assumes existence of a common demos, a single European community ideally encompassing the citizens of all the member states. Of course, such a community can be only "imagined". This term, coined by Anderson (1990), means that even though members of a community can hardly meet most of other members, they still retain the mental *image* of their communion. The typical example is a nation state, whose size prevents citizens from knowing each other in person. For this type of communities, common identities and values are essential because the ties between members cannot be based on the face-to-face interactions, as they are in small groups.

Everything that social actors appraise, desire, or recommend, can be considered as a value. Value holders can be individual or collective actors and core values of a society are held by the whole population. Common values are an important defining element of every community. On the one hand, values maintain and regulate a particular society, providing foundations and legitimacy for social norms. On the other hand, values contribute to the formation of group identity. According to Rezsóházy (2002), "the group sees in its values one of the major reasons of its members' adhesion, the common denominator of the participants".

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A collective identity is expected to arise if two conditions are satisfied. First, a certain degree of commonality has to be achieved. In this context, Deutsch, et al. (1957: 46) highlighted the role of compatible *values*, "incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behavior", for creation of what he called "security communities", that is regions, where any large-scale use of violence became unthinkable (for instance Western Europe). Fuchs and Klingemann (2002) argued that common political values and behaviors are not only *sufficient* for the formation of the European demos, but they are also the sole commonality practically *achievable* in Europe. As Fuchs and Klingemann (2002) warned, common values can have an identity-forming effect only if they constitute a part of the group's self-description. But the emphasis on the "community of values" in the contemporary discourse indicates that Europe *is* redefining itself around the concept of common values, whatever this term means.

Second, the identity of "us" is usually constituted in relation to the "Other", as is shown by numerous studies in the field of social psychology.¹ Every community needs ties between the members as well as a boundary defining who is included and who is excluded. Membership is based on both self-ascription and ascription by others: individuals claim membership in a particular group and others confirm it. Communities attached to a certain territory (for example the Bavarians, the Germans, the Europeans) define themselves by subjective assimilation of a territorial boundary differentiating between themselves and outsiders.

Deutsch, et al. (1957) concluded that security communities emerged when the values supported by the inhabitants of a given territory were not only compatible, but also significantly different from the values of their neighbors, or the values that prevailed in that area in the recent past. Ideational boundaries between communities are thus drawn where different

¹ A summary of the Social Identity Theory can be found in Brown (2000). In the context of European identities, see for example Meinhof (2004).

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value systems collide (Bellamy, 2004). For example, a Western European "Other" in the early years of European integration was the Communist bloc, characterized by an antagonistic value system, and so the eastern border of the imagined Europe more or less followed the main fault line of the Cold War. Of course, this is not the exhaustive description because, as Waever (1998) pointed out, Europe after the disastrous WWII was also redefined in contrast to its own *past*. One of the consequences of such a definition (temporal instead of spatial) is that the territorial boundary of a community cannot be absolutely rigid. The European Communities did not disappear with the USSR. On the contrary, it expanded eastward, integrating the countries, which were clearly excluded during the Cold War from the European community of values.

State borders are constructed both physically and socially. However, the physical boundary of the EU is quite blurry. The EU itself can be described rather as a web of overlapping institutions, norms, and networks, involving states, supranational bodies, and non-state actors. On the one hand, internal borders still persist (see for example constraints on the free movement of the citizens of twelve new member states or continuation of separate currencies). On the other hand, diverse countries outside the EU enjoy some of the insiders' privileges (for example Norway within the European Economic Area) or have concluded special agreements with the Union as a whole (for example countries of the Mediterranean).

Consequently, ideational borders are of crucial importance for the development of the European collective identity. It is not a coincidence that the public opinion merged the issues of deepening and spatial limits of European integration, with a ridiculous result that we could observe during the campaign before the French referendum in 2005, when the fear of "*plombier Polonais*" and forceful "*non à la Turquie en Europe*" became decisive arguments against the EU Constitution. Since the concept of the community of values and its borders lies in the center of the current

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European political discourse, political science should react by analyzing the values held by people in a wider European space.

The key European values can be derived from the official documents of the EU. Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) stated that the Community policy "shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms". The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) declared that the EU is founded "on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States". The Preamble of the European Constitution listed among the core values appreciated by the EU "equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason... the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law" (CONV 850/03). The Copenhagen membership criteria from 1993 require that the candidate country achieves "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" before its accession to the EU. In addition, analyzing European educational spheres, Soysal (2002) found that the European identity arises from a loose collection of universalistic ideals of democracy, progress, human rights and gender equality.

To sum up, the most frequently proclaimed key values of the EU are democracy, rule of law, tolerance of minorities, and gender equality – values that are also examined by some large cross-national surveys. Respect of minorities and gender equality may also serve as a proxy for other human rights, not explicitly listed in the cited documents and even less frequently studied by cross-national surveys.

The state-level approach assumes significance of *spatial* differences in support of political and social values. The claim that the Turks appreciate a different set of values than the Dutch is based on the assumption that differences between countries are more important than variation within

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countries. However, Barth (1969) argued that boundaries (defined by cultural differences) can be also purely *social*, without territorial dimension. That is the reason why an individual-level analysis, comparing the effect and significance of both spatially and socially defined distributions of the European values among people, is included.

In addition to political and social values, this paper also analyzes the public confidence in the EU, since it appears to be an important identity-forming value. As Bellamy (2004: 44) pointed out, boundaries are created by "the differentiated levels of loyalty that individuals and groups give to their state or locale". According to this logic, a European collective identity is hardly imaginable without loyalty to the chief European institution.

I complement this analysis by mapping salience of the collective European identity itself across the European countries. The common European identity is promoted by the European Commission in order to foster better relations between nations nested within the superordinate European group (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004), but it is also feared by Eurosceptics, who disparage the very same initiative of the Commission as threatening salience of national identities (The Independent, 2005).

Finally, I address the mutual trust within the presumed European community. As Fukuyama (1995: 25) pointed out, "communities depend on mutual trust". The reason is that trust inspires solidarity among people – a precondition of any sustainable community building (Uslaner, 2002). Therefore, even if my analysis fails to identify any homogenous zone characterized by common values and identities, the European community may still appear as a bounded network of highly trustful relations between the peoples.

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Research Design

The first part of my paper uses the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File released by ICPSR (thenceforth WVS).² Both surveys were conducted in the period 1999-2001. WVS represents the most comprehensive cross-national survey dealing with a wide range of social, political, and other values. I included only territories belonging to or neighboring (in a very broad sense) the EU.³

Since the respondent's opinion about each value can be indicated by several questions, I constructed four composite variables measuring the support of the studied values (see Appendix): support of democracy, attitude to the rule of law (operationalized as law abidance), respect of minorities, and support of gender equality.

I aggregated the data to the level of territories (mostly independent countries – see footnote 2). Four maps were created to describe spatial distribution of the studied values in a wider European area.

In the following section, multivariate OLS regression was applied to analyze significance of cross-national differences, controlling for other factors. The basic unit is the individual respondent questioned in the WVS. Support of democracy, respect of minorities, and support of gender equality are the dependent variables. The first independent variable indicates whether the respondent lived in one of three historical regions (post-

² European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I [Computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version. European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. The dataset is available from ICPSR under the code ICPSR 3975.

³ The territories included in this part of the analysis are Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Communist societies, Muslim societies – operationalized by an absolute majority of Muslims in country, and Western societies – a category encompassing the rest of the dataset). If values held by people are primarily shaped by those macroregions – as is expected by those who argue that the Muslim societies can never be really “European” – the studied effect should be strong and significant.

For the sake of comparison, I also include several country-specific effects (lagged by one year). The first of them is GDP per capita (reported by the World Bank). The human development theory predicts that economic development gives rise to a cultural change fostering certain values such as democracy or gender equality (Inglehart, et al., 2004). Second, public backing of liberal values (endorsed by the EU) might result from socialization of citizens by democratic institutions and norms. Therefore, the nature of political regime is measured, using the Polity score from the Polity IV dataset.

Control variables measured at the individual level include tertiary education (coded by a dichotomous variable) since higher education provides people with more information about politics and thus also with more opportunities to be politically active (Inglehart, 1970; Milbrath and Goel, 1982). Education also influences attitudes toward the European and national identities (Schild, 2001). Another control variable is age (dichotomous variable for the age group 15-29 years) because of the observed substantial differences between the values held by older and younger generations (Inglehart, et al., 2004). Finally, a dichotomous variable for upper income is included to take into account the impact of social stratification.

In addition to political and social values, I also analyzed confidence in the EU and citizens' attachment to the European identity. The latter variable indicates whether the respondent listed Europe as either the first or the second choice while asked to which geographical group he/she belongs.


Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Finally, I used social network analysis to study the bilateral trust. The unit of analysis is the directed dyad (such as Belgium-France, meaning the Belgians' trust of the French). In this part of the paper, I used the data from Eurobarometer 46.0 (conducted in October and November 1996).⁴

Findings and Discussion

Map 1 shows the mean value of support of democracy in different territories.⁵

Map 1. Average Support of Democracy




⁴ Melich, Anna. EUROBAROMETER 46.0: PERSONAL HEALTH, ENERGY, DEVELOPMENT AID, AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN CURRENCY, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1996 [Computer file]. Conducted by INRA (Europe), Brussels. ZA ed. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung [producer]/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2000.

⁵ The darkest shade is used for the greatest support of the value – the greatest support of democracy in this case. The lightest shade of gray (that of Switzerland or Tunisia) marks the countries not included in the analysis due to the lack of data.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

There is an apparent democratic core of Europe, forming an axis from Sweden to Germany to Italy to Greece. Support of democracy gradually declines both westward and eastward from this region. The least democratic societies are found on the periphery of Europe: in the former USSR, Eastern Balkans, Turkey, and Portugal. The findings of Fuchs and Klingemann (2002) are similar: the support of democracy gradually declines from Western Europe to Central Europe to Balkans to Baltic to Eastern Europe. However, it is interesting to note a remarkably high support of democracy in Morocco and Egypt – two autocratic states (see Map 1). Moreover, there is surprisingly little difference between the states of former Yugoslavia and countries in Central (or even Western) Europe. This result might indicate that the influence of Tito's regime (more liberal than in the rest of the Communist world) is still visible despite the recent experience with civil war and authoritarian regimes.

Map 2. Average Support of Rule of Law




Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Map 2 shows a patchwork of states differentiated by the levels of law abidance (serving in this paper to indicate public attitude to rule of law). Law abidance is definitely highest in Middle-Eastern countries. But it is almost equally high in Protestant Denmark and Catholic Poland, Western European Ireland and post-Communist Bulgaria. Apart from the clearly lowest law abidance in the former Soviet Union and the highest law abidance in the Middle East, there is no other obvious pattern. It is plausible that the difference for example between low law abidance in the United Kingdom and high law abidance in Romania may be explained rather by imperfection of the data. For instance, the interviewed persons in some countries might have suspected that their answers to sensitive questions would be abused or they simply desired to improve the image of their country in a worldwide survey. Dubious robustness of law abidance as measured by the WVS is obvious when one looks at the discrepancy between the WVS answers to the question whether it is justifiable to accept bribe and the official Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International. Since reliability of the data is questionable, I decided to exclude this variable from the subsequent analysis.

Map 3 shows a clear-cut geographic divide created by regional variations in tolerance of minorities. People in North-Western Europe (roughly from Portugal to Sweden) exhibit generally more respect of minorities than people in Muslim, South-Eastern (including Italy) and Eastern European countries. However, the revealed geographic difference matches neither the actual border of the EU, nor the line dividing the old and new members of the EU. Furthermore, tolerance of minorities seems rather to gradually decline with the distance from the benchmark North Western European states than to fall sharply after crossing some kind of geographic border. The Germans are on average more tolerant than the Czechs, who are more tolerant than the Poles, who are more tolerant than the Ukrainians, who are yet less tolerant than the Russians.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.


Map 3. Average Tolerance of Minorities



Gender equality is highly appreciated especially in the Nordic and Baltic States. People living in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Northern Ireland also belong to that group of liberal Northern Europeans. Other countries with considerable support of gender equality include Spain, Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia. The opposite pole of the scale is taken by the countries with a Muslim majority, Malta, Moldova, and some of the Balkan countries. In contrast to respect of minorities and support of democracy, gender equality appears to form rather smaller clusters of states (such as Northern Europe or Muslim countries). Variation within the Western European nucleus of the EU is considerable.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Map 4. Average Support of Gender Equality



At first glance, it is fairly difficult to delimit any borders of the supposed European community of values. There is no clear boundary encircling a single community of values, but instead, several regions (such as the former USSR, Muslim countries, or Northern Europe) appear to yield similar attitudes. Despite significant (though generally weak) correlation between some of the key European values at the level of individuals (see Table 1), it is difficult to find any territorial unit supporting all of the proclaimed core values of the EU. In other words, a cognitive Europe has no visible Heartland. In the case of democracy, there is a difference between Western and Central Europe (surprisingly including former Yugoslavia but excluding the Baltics and Poland) on the one hand, and Eastern Europe along with Turkey and Portugal on the other hand. Nevertheless, tolerance of minorities cuts Europe rather into the more tolerant North-West and the less tolerant South-East. Public support of gender equality distinguishes

Tuscisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

several regions, such as more respectful Northern Europe (excluding the UK) and less tolerant Muslim societies.

Table 1. Correlation between variables

	<i>Support of Democracy</i>	<i>Respect of Minorities</i>	<i>Support of Gender Equality</i>
<i>Support of Democracy</i>		0.233**	0.137**
<i>Respect of Minorities</i>	0.233**		0.317**
<i>Gender Equality</i>	0.137**	0.317**	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

N varies because of missing values from 41,265 to 58,722.

Weak correlation between the key values of the EU (reported in Table 1) also demonstrates that there is no unique quality of “Europeaness” constituted by liberal values. In fact, a European can believe in gender equality despite an unenthusiastic support of democracy and vice versa.

Regression analysis presented below compares the effect of large cultural regions with the impact of state-level and individual-level controlling variables.⁶

The impact of cultural macro-regions is statistically significant, but not very strong, while controlled for other factors. What is quite surprising, both the Muslim and post-Communist societies seem to value democracy slightly more than people in more developed states (see Table 2). This result may be attributed to the fact that a higher support of democracy in western Europe can be explained by the higher economic development, the strongest predictor in the model. As expected by the theory, democracy is also more supported by well-educated people with higher income. But, again counterintuitively, the Polity score decreases support of democracy in the

⁶ Only the clusters of the Muslim and post-Communist countries are included to explore the differences of those regions in comparison to the baseline Western European countries.

Tuscisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

population. The surprising negative sign of the coefficient is fully explained by the high public support of democracy in the autocratic kingdom of Morocco and it would change if Morocco was excluded.

TABLE 2. *Regression Predicting Support of Democracy*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust s.e.</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Muslim Cluster	0.360	0.044	0.000	0.129
Post-Communist C.	0.127	0.038	0.001	0.054
GDP per Capita	6.86e-05	2.29e-06	0.000	0.503
Polity Score	-0.038	0.002	0.000	-0.151
Tertiary Education	0.445	0.015	0.049	0.151
Age 15-29 Years	0.030	0.015	0.000	0.011
Upper Income	0.086	0.014	0.000	0.034

R²=0.155. N=27,650. Constant omitted from the table.

TABLE 3. *Regression Predicting Tolerance of Minorities*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust s.e.</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Muslim Cluster	-0.184	0.011	0.000	-0.264
Post-Communist C.	0.004	0.009	0.688	0.006
GDP per Capita	9.05e-06	5.48e-07	0.000	0.260
Polity Score	-0.002	3.88e-04	0.000	-0.039
Tertiary Education	0.089	0.004	0.000	0.117
Age 15-29 Years	0.029	0.003	0.000	0.042
Upper Income	0.021	0.003	0.000	0.032

R²=0.200. N=30,507. Constant omitted from the table.

The strongest effect reported in Table 3 is the one of the predominantly Muslim societies. People in the Muslim countries tend to be less tolerant to minorities. The effect of economic development is again positive and very strong. Tolerance of minorities is also increased by

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

tertiary education, lower age, and higher income. In contrast, the coefficient of democracy has a negative sign while controlled for other factors (especially GDP per capita, which correlates significantly with the Polity score and thus makes it less meaningful). The group of the post-Communist countries is apparently too heterogeneous, so the Communist heritage does not influence tolerance of minorities in any consistent way.

TABLE 4. *Regression Predicting Support of Gender Equality*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust s.e.</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Muslim Cluster	-0.654	0.028	0.000	-0.340
Post-Communist C.	-0.007	0.025	0.789	-0.004
GDP per Capita	5.80e-06	1.50e-06	0.000	0.061
Polity Score	-7.75e-04	0.001	0.448	-0.005
Tertiary Education	0.326	0.011	0.000	0.155
Age 15-29 Years	0.188	0.010	0.000	0.101
Upper Income	0.057	0.009	0.000	0.032

R²=0.168. N=30,632. Constant omitted from the table.

Similarly to the previous variable, gender equality is supported less in the Muslim societies, but the effect of post-Communism is not significant. The impact of political regime is statistically insignificant while compared to a stronger positive effect of GDP per capita. An insignificant coefficient of Polity score and a relatively low coefficient of economic development indicate that gender stereotypes are anchored in culture and the attitudes of people toward gender equality are not substantially influenced by modernization and democratization. This finding helps explain why support of gender equality in some democratic countries (e.g. Italy) is weaker than the same attitude in newly democratized states of the former USSR, where gender equality had been (despite numerous violations of other human rights) endorsed by the Soviet government since 1917. In

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

addition, gender equality is valued by people having tertiary education, lower age, and higher income.

To sum up, the heterogeneity of the large cultural regions within Europe has been confirmed to some extent also by quantitative analysis. The effect of the Muslim societies is independent from the country-specific economic and political factors. People in the countries with a Muslim majority declaratorily value democracy more than the Westerners do, but their tolerance of minorities and support of gender equality are lower. The group of post-Communist states is too heterogeneous and attitudes are too inconsistent. This is basically true for all three clusters, as I showed by a series of maps above. In fact, different values create their own dividing lines over the continent and there is no easily identifiable core of the European community of values. This finding somewhat contradicts the conclusion of Fuchs and Klingemann (2002: 50) that the differences between countries, yet "not very pronounced" can be "mapped on geographical west-east axis". A plausible explanation is that their study dealt solely with aspects of democratic community. If we include more values, the dividing line identified by Fuchs and Klingemann (2002) becomes less obvious. On the other hand, the findings presented in this paper confirm an earlier observation that "no threshold can be identified between West and East, only a continuous decline in the extent of a democratic community" Fuchs and Klingemann (2002: 50).

The best positive predictor of the popular support of the European liberal values is the level of economic development. The effect of cross-country variation in GDP per capita is in some cases stronger and generally more consistent than the effect of cultural macro-regions. As to other variables, the signs of the individual-level variables (education, age, income) are in the expected direction and the effect of education competes with the influence of a predominantly Muslim society.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Nevertheless, the regression models presented in this study do not explain more than 20 percent of variance. In other words, the gap between different societies living in a wider European space is not unmanageable and cultural or political boundaries do not isolate closed value systems. According to ANOVA (the results not reported in the paper), the differences between the cultural macro-regions explain no more than 19% of variance in the studied values. Differences between countries explain at best 28% of variance (in the case of respect of minorities). In other words, social differences *within* countries are more important than the boundaries drawn between territorial units.

Furthermore, the presented static view does not take into account the ongoing cultural change. If the values held by the Turks and the Dutch for instance, significantly differ now, it does not mean that they will not converge in the future. Correlation with GDP per capita and education suggests that liberal values could gain more popular support due to the economic growth and a better education. But an analysis of the dynamics of value change is beyond the scope of this paper.


Since no community of values could be safely delimited in space, the subsequent analysis will try to identify an imagined European community by the attachment of people to the idea of Europe and by loyalty to Europe's most visible common institution. Map 5 shows the levels of popular confidence in the European Union across the European countries.

Unsurprisingly, the EU is quite popular in the countries, which have been able to buttress their economies thanks to the EU's structural funds (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy). Another group sympathetic to the EU comprises states that have experienced problems with authoritarian regime or civil strife in their recent history (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and to some extent Slovakia). The EU may be perceived by their populations as a reference group of democratic and developed countries, an ideal that should be followed. This interpretation is

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

in line with the earlier findings of Sánchez-Cuenca (2000), who found a higher support of the EU where the opinion about the national political system was less favorable. In these cases, the European integration is seen as preferable to the domestic corruption and inefficient provision of welfare.

Map 5. Average Confidence in the EU



On the other hand, we can find the least support of the EU in the territories with little prospect of accession to this political entity (Russia, Northern Africa, Serbia). The observed lack of positive perception there can be eventually attributed to a different source of identity, not attached to the idea of “Europe”. As showed by White, et al. (2002), citizens of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine doubt whether their own countries are “European”. But the level of confidence in the EU is quite low also in some member states (Greece and Northern Europe) and in Turkey. From the strictly geographical point of view, the EU seems to be generally less

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

popular on the periphery of the continent and more popular toward the center of the mainland.

Salience of the European identity is measured on a smaller sample of countries because the question (see appendix) has not been asked in the Middle Eastern and North African countries. Table 5 basically confirms the results from the previous section. The lowest attachment to the European identity was recorded in Russia, whose population is not sure whether it really belongs to Europe (White, et al., 2002). Citizens of two countries with a Muslim majority do not feel very European either. On the other hand, a state-level analysis cannot establish correlation between the religion and European identity due to the danger of ecological fallacy. It is perfectly plausible that a weak attachment to the European identity in two Muslim countries can be explained by the bleak prospects of their accession to the EU or some other utterly non-religious factors.

The range of the studied variable is comparable among the Western and Eastern European countries. Although five out of six original members of the European Community are characterized by a very high percentage of people self-identified as belonging to Europe, this is not true for the sixth member (Germany). Two relatively new member states of the EU, Sweden and Greece, are also among the countries with the highest European self-identification. In Eastern Europe, a cluster of states with an ambiguous national identity (Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) is characterized by a pronounced European identity, yielding the levels similar to the EU6. It is plausible, that the idea of Europe is seen more as an alternative to an uncertain state identity and/or to a low-status ethnic identity there. To sum up, attachment to the European identity is not consistently stronger in Western Europe. On the other hand, there may be two distinct reasons why people prefer this superordinate identity to other territorial identities: Western Europeans because of their successful integration and Eastern Europeans because they see it as a high-status reference group to follow.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Table 5 – Attachment to the European identity

Territory	Percentage	Territory	Percentage
<i>Western territories</i>		<i>Post-Communist terr.</i>	
Luxembourg	33.2	Bosnia and Herzeg.	26.1
Belgium	21.6	Montenegro	21.8
Netherlands	18.1	Serbia	18.6
Italy	17.5	Macedonia	16.7
France	17.2	Bulgaria	14.6
Sweden	16.0	Slovakia	14.4
Greece	15.1	Moldova	12.2
Austria	12.1	Croatia	11.1
Portugal	11.0	Lithuania	10.4
Finland	9.9	Czech Republic	10.3
Great Britain	9.5	Ukraine	9.7
Denmark	8.9	Romania	8.9
Germany	8.2	Slovenia	8.7
Spain	8.2	Estonia	8.5
Iceland	7.1	Hungary	7.9
Ireland	5.9	Latvia	7.8
Northern Ireland	5.4	Poland	7.6
<i>Muslim territories</i>		Belarus	7.1
Turkey	7.4	Russia	2.4
Albania	6.6		

The previous sections of this paper pointed to the differences existing both between and within countries and rendering the presumed homogeneity of the European community highly questionable. The final step is to analyze the bilateral trust between the European societies. The data were obtained from a Eurobarometer survey carried on in 1996 in 15 countries of the EU. The respondents answered the question whether they

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

trust people from various European and non-European countries. On the scale from 1 (minimal trust) to 4 (maximal trust), negative answers predominate below the middle point of 2.5 and positive answers above it. Indegree is the number of the countries in EU15, in which positive attitudes towards the given nation exceeded negative attitudes.

Among 15 old member states, only one country (Greece) was regarded as rather untrustworthy by its fellow members of the EU (see table 6). Besides Greece, we can find only non-member countries in that category: Turkey and Russia did not receive the mean score of trust above 2.5 from any country in the EU. Four candidates for membership (at that time) from Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) were described as mostly trustworthy only by the Irish and the Danes. On the other hand, the survey also revealed a highly positive perception of Switzerland and Norway, and to lesser extent also of the US and Japan.

This finding indicates that the patterns of trust reflect to great extent either the main dividing line of the Cold War or the socio-economic difference between the developed and developing states. The network diagram presented in figure 1 is more illustrative. Although the average level of mutual trust within the original member states of the EU is quite high, it is not significantly higher in comparison to trust of people from other developed states, such as Norway, USA, and Japan. Although those states do not aspire to the EU membership and do not share the common European identity, they are seen as more trustful than four candidates (as of 1996) for membership from Central Europe. If there is any international community defined by mutual trust, it is not restricted to Europe, but rather comprises economically developed states in general.


Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Table 6 – Nations Ranked According to the Trust Received from EU15

Nation	Mean trust from EU15	Indegree
Swiss	3,00	14
Swedes	2,99	13
Norwegians	2,95	11
Danes	2,94	11
Luxembourgers	2,92	12
Dutch	2,90	11
Finns	2,89	10
Germans	2,85	9
Austrians	2,85	10
Belgians	2,80	10
Spaniards	2,72	8
French	2,72	7
Americans	2,68	6
Portuguese	2,62	7
Irish	2,60	7
British	2,60	7
Japanese	2,55	7
Italians	2,54	5
Greeks	2,47	3
Hungarians	2,35	2
Polish	2,28	2
Czechs	2,26	2
Slovaks	2,17	2
Russians	1,96	0
Turks	1,88	0

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Figure 1 – Average Trust in a Shrunk Network of European Countries




The complete network (figure 2) confirms that Norway and Switzerland (and to some extent also USA and Japan) are safely embedded in the network of trustful relations, while less developed Greece and Portugal are connected to the rest of the network only by few weak links.⁷ The post-Communist countries of Central Europe are even more isolated. This result is in line with the previous finding that the societies in Eastern and Southern Europe have only low levels of interpersonal trust and they are not regarded as very trustworthy by their Western European counterparts either (Delhey, 2005). Russia and Turkey are not connected to the network at all because none of the surveyed European nations considered them more trustworthy than untrustworthy.

⁷ The area of the nodes of the network is proportional to the indegree from table 6. The ties represent the dyads with an average trust exceeding the mid-point of 2.5. Their thickness is proportional to the average value of trust on the dyad. Black color marks six original members of the EC/EU, dark and light gray new members (before and in 2004), and white non-members.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Figure 2 – Average Trust between European Countries



Although Delhey (2005) found that the EU6 would be more cohesive today than the EU25 is, the network of trustful relations is not consistently denser among the oldest member states. In fact, Italians are still seen by other members of the original EU6 as less trustful than Swedes.

On the other hand, my static approach does not contradict the thesis that European integration may increase trust in Europe over time. Delhey (2005) showed that the overall level of bilateral trust within EU has been growing since the 1970s and the initially negative stereotypes towards the new members generally changed after each wave of enlargement.⁸ The Germans trusted the Italians in 1976 less than they trust the Czechs and Hungarians today. In 1976, the nations of the EU6 did not trust each other more and they were not familiar with each other more than the nations of the future EU25 were in 1996 (Delhey, 2005: 12).

⁸ Delhey (2005) also lists few exceptions, however: The levels of transnational trust remained unchanged by the EU membership in the UK, Ireland, and Portugal and the Greeks even became less trustful in the 1990s.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Although the causal mechanism is more complex, the European integration certainly contributed to this growth of mutual trust. In 1956, 41% of decided French respondents had "no confidence at all" in West Germany and 39% had "not much confidence" (Ripsman, 2005). A survey organized 16 years later reported that 86% of the decided French respondents did not see Germany as a danger for France. When asked why they no longer feared Germany, 35% cited membership in the European Communities (Ripsman, 2005).

Conclusion

Both partisans and opponents of the EU enlargement often define Europe as a delimited area of common values and culture. On the one hand, countries like Turkey are emphasizing that they used to be part of the European history. On the other hand, Western European leaders often entertain the idea that their peoples are inherently similar, but different from the Turkish and Russian Other. The very idea of the European citizenship is based on the assumption that there is a unique European demos, a societal basis for the democratic supranational institutions. But my paper showed that the political integration of Europe is not reflected to a great degree at the level of societies.

Despite some substantial differences between Western European and Muslim countries, no territorial core of the imagined Europe can be distinguished as far as the commonality of values and the attachment to the common European identity are concerned. Although there is some correlation in support of liberal values proclaimed to be the core values of the EU, they are rarely all appreciated by the same individuals or societies. Support of the key European values creates geographic divides between countries, but this differentiation is not at all consistent. Moreover, geographic distinction is usually rather gradual than sharp.

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

My analysis also highlighted the impact of country-specific factors, especially that of economic development. This result is in line with Delhey (2005), who found that modernization of accession countries was crucial for further growth of trust in them. It also provides some evidence to the human development theory, according to which economic development should also bring cultural change (Inglehart, et al., 2004).

The most important finding is that spatial borders in Europe are not as important as social differences within the same territories. A well-educated Turk can in fact hold a stronger European identity and support the key European values more than an unemployed Frenchman. The European community of values is still rather an abstraction than an empirical fact. But the absence of clear territorial borders of such a community means that there is no reason to stop enlargement of the EU under the pretext of protecting common values of the present member states. Artificial divisions can only antagonize people living outside the "desirable" borders of imagined Europe. I believe that the discourse should return to the more relevant economic and security arguments because the value dimension seems to be overestimated in the light of the real data.

Appendix – Questions Used to Construct Composite Variables

Support of Democracy

Item 1 "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?"

"Having a democratic political system."

Item 2 "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?"

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

"Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government."

Item 3 "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?"

"Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections."

Item 4 "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?"

"Having the army rule."

Scale values of the composite variable run from -3 ("low support of democracy") to +3 ("high support of democracy").

Rule of Law

"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card" (Interviewer: read out statements. Code one answer for each statement.)

Item 1 "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled."

Item 2 "Avoiding a fare on public transport."

Item 3 "Cheating on taxes if you have a chance."

Item 4 "Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties."

The mean of the scores forms the index "Rule of Law". Scale values run from 1 "low degree of law abidingness" to 10 "high degree of law abidingness".

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Respect of Minorities

"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?"

Item 1 "People of a different race."

Item 2 "Muslims."

Item 3 "Immigrants/foreign workers."

Item 4 "People who have AIDS."

Item 5 "Homosexuals."

Item 6 "Jews."

Item 7 "Evangelists."

Item 8 "People of a different religion."

Item 9 "Militant minority."

Item 10 "People not from country of origin."

Item 11 "Gypsies."

Item 12 "Indians or Lebanese."

Item 13 "Chinese or Philippino Chinese."

Item 14 "Spiritists."

Item 15 "Protestants."

Item 16 "Christians."

Item 17 "Witchdoctors and related labels."

Item 18 "Hindus."

Item 19 "Haitians."

Item 20 "Members of new religious movements."

Item 21 "Kurds, Esids."

The mean of the scores forms the index "Respect of Minorities". Scale values run from 0 "low respect" to 1 "high respect".

Gender Equality

Item 1 "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than"

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

Item 2 "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?"

For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

Item 3 "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay."

Item 4 "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do."

Item 5 "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl."

Scale values run from 1 "low support" to 4 "high support".

Confidence in the EU

"Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?"

Item 1 "EU."

Scale values run from 1 "none at all" to 4 "great deal".

European identity

Item 1 "To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?" "Europe."

Item 2 "And the next?" "Europe."

Scale values run from 0 "not mentioned" to 1 "mentioned".

Trust

Item 1 "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all?"

Scale values run from 1 "no trust at all" to 4 "a lot of trust".

Tusicisny, Andrej: "Myth Busted: Identities, Values, and Mutual Trust in the European Community," paper presented at the 'Rebels and Critics: Assessing Fifty Years of European Integration conference,' Washington, DC, USA, February 2-3, 2007.

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